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Abstract
Should health care provision be public, private, or both? We look at this question in a setting where
people differ in their earnings capacity and express an inelastic demand for health care. We assume
that illness reduces a person’s health status when not receiving immediate treatment. Treatment can be
obtained in a competitive private sector or in the National Health Service (NHS) where it is provided free
of charge but after some (endogenous) waiting time. The equilibrium in the health care sector consists
of a fee for private consultations and a contract offered to NHS physicians such that no physician has an
incentive to switch place of work, and in addition a waiting time in the NHS such that no patient wants
to switch health care provider. This equilibrium is governed by three public policies: the income tax
system, the subsidy of private health care, and the terms of the contract offered to NHS physicians. Our
findings are threefold. First, a mixed system with a small public health care sector gives a lower social
welfare level than a pure private system. Second, a mixed system with a sufficiently large NHS may
improve upon a pure private system if the distribution of earnings capacities in society is sufficiently
wide. And finally, whatever the size of the NHS, the doctors working there should be given a contract
that specifies a heavier work load than the one their private colleagues choose. This is the way the
government can exert its monopsony power on the market for physicians to improve social welfare.
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1 Introduction
In several OECD countries, health care is mainly provided publicly and
ﬁnanced out of tax revenue or social insurance contributions. Examples
are Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In these countries, there
also exists a parallel private health care sector. In Norway, this private
sector is still small, but experience from other countries suggests that it
may grow to a signiﬁcant level. In the UK, for instance, where the NHS
is free of charge, the proportion of private expenditure in total expendi-
ture on health care has grown from 9% in 1979 to 15% in 1995 (Propper,
2000). The other extreme is a health care system mainly ﬁnanced by
private means, as in the US and Switzerland.
There exists by now a large literature collecting the arguments in
favour and against one type of health care or the other. The papers by
Besley and Gouveia (1994), Cullis et al (1999), Propper and Green (1999)
are examples. This literature covers many dimensions: from eﬃciency
and equity to political sustainability and administration. The purpose
of our paper is more modest in the sense that we want to construct a
formal and consistent framework within which we can discuss some, but
certainly not all, dimensions in the debate on a ‘private vs public’ health
care system. Our main concern in this paper is to examine some equity
arguments in favour of a mixed system.
Our approach will therefore abstract from a number of aspects. Some
of these are of minor importance but others are not, and in so far as they
are not present our model should be considered as a benchmark. Thus,
in this paper we will abstract from the uncertain incidence of illness,
the informational asymmetries between patients and physicians, and the
market power of physicians. Obviously, these are all important charac-
teristics in the market for health care, and the only reason for not having
them in the picture is that we want to develop a simple setting that we
can handle in a formal way.
We consider an economy where citizens need a well-deﬁned medical
treatment once a year. These citizens diﬀer in earnings capacity. For
receiving treatment they can resort either to the NHS or to the pri-
1
vate market for health care. In the former, health care is free of charge
but rationing takes place through waiting lists. In the latter, the com-
petitive price mechanism makes demand compatible with supply. The
total number of physicians is allowed to depend on their living standard.
Private physicians determine themselves how many consultations to per-
form, while the work load and salary of NHS doctors is speciﬁed in a
labour contract with the government. In equilibrium, physicians are in-
diﬀerent where to work and no patient wants to change physician. In
particular, all citizens with a earnings capacity below a certain level will
resort to the NHS while the others buy a private treatment. We anal-
yse the arguments that a welfare maximising government should account
for when deciding on (i) the size of the NHS, (ii) the subsidy of private
health care, (iii) the terms of the contract it oﬀers to NHS physicians,
and (iv) the parameters of a linear income tax. Our main conclusions
are threefold. First, a small NHS system is not desirable. The social
beneﬁts are of second order importance relative to the associated social
costs. Second, it may be optimal to have an extensive public health care
system, but a necessary condition for this is that the spread in the income
distribution is suﬃciently wide. Third, there is a good reason for having
an NHS labour contract such that public physicians work harder than
their private colleagues. In this way the government can use its monop-
sony power on the market for physicians to improve social welfare. It
means that there is some optimal departure from production eﬃciency
as the marginal reservation wage is higher in the NHS than in the private
market.
It is noteworthy that if there were no limit to redistribution, that is if
lump-sum income taxes and transfers could be diﬀerentiated by individ-
ual abilities, an indiﬀerence about the mix of NHS and private practice
would result in our setting. This emphasizes that when it is socially op-
timal to operate a mixed system, it is because it allows to move forward
the limits to redistribution beyond those implementable through feasible
tax-and-transfer policies.
Analytical work on these issues is both recent and sparse. We men-
tion two contributions related to our paper.1 Iversen (1997) lets patients
1Brekke and Sørgard’s (2000) approach is more distant from ours because they
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diﬀer in their income and the expected health beneﬁt of treatment. He
looks at the eﬀect of a private sector on the waiting time for treatment
in public hospitals. When patients are admitted to a waiting list without
consideration of the expected health beneﬁt of treatment, Iversen shows
that the presence of a private sector results in a longer waiting time if
the demand for treatment in public hospitals is suﬃciently elastic with
respect to waiting time. When waiting list admissions are rationed, the
waiting time is shown to increase if public-sector physicians are allowed
to work in the private sector in their spare time.
The model developed by Hoel and Sæther (2000) is closer to ours.
They have patients diﬀering in their willingness to wait for treatment.
There is a public health sector where patients are put on a waiting list
and are treated at a constant marginal cost. But patients have also the
option to turn to a private sector where the marginal cost of treatment is
at least as high as in the public sector. They ﬁnd that it may be optimal
to have an active private sector if there is suﬃcient inequality in pa-
tient’s willingness to spend time waiting. They also discuss the optimal
level of subsidy of private care and how the size of that subsidy aﬀects
the political support for a public health system with a lower waiting time.
The paper is organized as follows. First we discuss patients’ choice
of resorting to either the NHS or a private practice (Section 2). Next,
we build a simple model of occupational choice in the medical profession.
When this is combined with the demand side, we are able to discuss how
the equilibrium in the health care sector depends on the contract oﬀered
to NHS physicians (Section 3) and in particular how the waiting time in
the NHS is determined (Section 4). Thereafter, we set up the normative
problem (Section 5) and analyse the optimality properties of the three
above mentioned policies: ﬁrst under a production eﬃciency requirement
consider an imperfect competition setting. Physicians in a local market for health
care divide their time between working in the public health sector (where they earn a
wage set by the government and cater for patients that they otherwise would have seen
in their private practice) and working in private. Brekke and Sørgard characterize
the equilibria both when the two physicians choose their labour supplies in the two
sectors non-cooperatively and when they coordinate. They look at the wage rate and
subsidy rate that maximise the sum of consumer and producer surplus, taking into
account a marginal cost of public funds.
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(Section 6) and next in a more general context where the government can
also oﬀer contracts that depart from production eﬃciency (Section 7).
Concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 8.
2 The demand for private and public health
care
Citizens care about their health status (h), consumption of a compos-
ite good (c) and leisure (). Their preferences on these three ‘goods’
can be described by an additive and strictly concave utility function
r(h) + u(c, ). We thus abstract from the possibility that better health
may enhance the enjoyment of consumption and leisure and that bad
health may aﬀect the disutility of labour. Throughout the paper, leisure
and the composite good are assumed to be normal goods.
All citizens are endowed with some earnings capacity (or ability) a,
and a time endowment normalised to 1. People are distributed over the
ability interval [a, a] according to the distribution function F (a) (with
density f(a)). We have in mind an ability distribution that is skewed to
the right, but we will also look at a numerical example with a uniform
distribution. Labour earnings are taxed at a constant marginal tax rate t,
and a per capita tax T is levied. Thus when working during L hours, the
disposable income of an individual of ability a amounts to (1− t)aL−T ,
and leisure time to 1 − L. His or her optimal labour supply satisﬁes
a(1− t)∂u/∂c = ∂u/∂.
Each year, every person needs one unit of medical treatment (one
consultation), and this treatment can be obtained either in the NHS or
in a private practice. There is free access to the NHS which is ﬁnanced
out of income tax revenue. However, a patient will be put on a waiting
list before receiving medical treatment in the NHS. If the patient has
to wait for w weeks, the discomfort in terms of reduced health status is
taken to be δw. Hence, utility when resorting to an NHS doctor is
r(h− δw) + v((1− t)a,−T) (1)
where h is the after-treatment health status in the absence of any waiting
time and v
(
(1 − t)a,m) is the indirect utility function giving the non-
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health utility for a net wage rate (1− t)a and exogenous income m when
labour supply is chosen at its optimal level, L((1 − t)a,m). For further
reference, we denote the marginal utility of income by α and remind the
reader of Roy’s identity: ∂v/∂t = −αaL.
If a patient goes to see a private doctor, she is given medical care on
the spot but will have to pay a consultation fee q. This out-of-pocket
fee can be smaller than what the physician receives for carrying out the
treatment if private medical care is subsidised. Overall utility is then
equal to
r(h) + v
(
(1− t)a,−T − q). (2)
Because health status is a normal good, there exists a critical ability
level â such that citizens with a higher ability make use of private health
care, while all those with a lower ability seek help with the NHS. Formally,
∃ â ∈ [a, a] : r(h− δw) + v((1− t)a,−T) T r(h) + v((1− t)a,−T − q)
⇐⇒ a S â. (3)
When we normalise the population size to unity, the demand for NHS
and private consultations is thus given by F (â) and 1−F (â), respectively.
3 The equilibrium conditions in the physi-
cian market
The total number of physicians will depend on the living standard one
can obtain in this occupation, denoted by U˜ , compared with the one
achieved in one of the alternative occupations. Thus, one can expect
that a higher utility level U˜ will convince more students to study for a
medical degree and join the medical profession. The supply of physicians
is then modelled as
M(U˜), with M ′ > 0,M ′′ < 0. (4)
We denote the elasticity of M with respect to U˜ by εMU .
2 The size of this
elasticity will depend on the time perspective one takes. In the short run,
2Throughout the paper, we will denote the elasticity of x w.r.t. z as εxz . Thus
εxz =
d ln x
d ln z .
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it is probably close to zero, while in the long run it can be signiﬁcantly
higher.
Physicians have preferences over consumption (c) and leisure () that
can be represented by a strictly quasi-concave utility function U(c, ).
They are endowed with one unit of time and have the opportunity to
work either for the NHS or in a private practice. An NHS contract spec-
iﬁes the number of consultations a physician is required to perform per
period (sN) as well as the salary (y). We do not consider the possibility
for NHS doctors to supplement their income with private consultations.
This is because we show later on that the optimal NHS contract would
not give them any incentive to do so.
We are assuming that the market for private health care is perfectly
competitive and abstract from any informational asymmetries that may
lead to agency problems and local monopoly power on behalf of the physi-
cian. The consultation fee that a private physician charges is denoted by
π. As mentioned earlier, this may diﬀer from the patient’s out-of-pocket
payment q owing to some (ad valorem) subsidy rate σ: q = (1 − σ)π.
Thus a private doctor takes the market price for private consultations,
π, as given and determines himself how many consultations to perform
per period by solving
max
sP
U(π sP , 1− sP ). (5)
Let the solution to the private physician’s problem be denoted as sP (π),
and the corresponding utility level as V (π).
Denoting the number of NHS and private physicians as MN and MP ,
respectively, we are now ready to state the equilibrium conditions for the
two markets:
MN ≥ 0,MP ≥ 0, (6)
MN +MP = M(U˜), (7)
sN MN + sP (π)MP = F (a), (8)
MN [U(y, 1− sN)− U˜ ] = 0 and U(y, 1− sN) ≤ U˜ , (9)
MP [V (π)− U˜ ] = 0 and V (π) ≤ U˜ . (10)
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Eq (7) states that the number of physicians working in the two sec-
tors should match the number willing to work in the medical profession.
Eq (8) ensures that the total number of consultations delivered in the two
sectors satisﬁes the total demand for consultations, equal to F (a) = 1.
Finally, eqs (9) and (10) are complementary slackness conditions that
make sure that a sector is active only if the living standard enjoyed by
working there equals the living standard of the medical profession.
By deﬁning the equilibrium in the doctor market in this way, we are
formally ruling out any rationing of doctor positions (implemented for
example through a limitation on the number of students admitted in
medical schools). Such rationing in the doctor market would be required
if the NHS contract (y, sN) was making the medical profession too attrac-
tive. However, it is clear that rationing is never optimal in our model
since if there were rationing, total public health expenditure could be
reduced by lowering the salary of NHS physicians, y.
The NHS contract will govern the type of equilibrium that obtains. If
there is coexistence of an NHS and a private sector, then the equilibrium
consultation fee in a private practice should not give any incentive for
a physician to switch sector. We denote the no-arbitrage fee when the
NHS contract is (y, sN) by π(y, sN). From (9) and (10), it is the value
for π that solves
U(y, 1− sN) = V (π). (11)
Therefore, when the NHS contract (y, sN) is chosen so as to make a
private and a public sector coexist (mixed system), the above system of
equations deﬁning the equilibrium in the doctor market simpliﬁes to
MN +MP = M
(
V (π(y, sN))
)
(12)
and
sN MN + sP
(
π(y, sN)
)
MP = F (a). (13)
If sN is equal to sP (π(y, sN)), these two equations do not provide a
unique solution for MN and MP . In that case (which we will study in
Section 6), the capacity of the NHS sector – let us label it KN (= sN MN)
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– has necessarily to be decided by the government. This determines then
the allocation of physicians across the two sectors.
On the contrary, if the NHS contract (y, sN) is such that sp(π(y, sN))
diﬀers from sN (as it will be the case in Section 7) and an NHS coexists at
equilibrium with a private sector, equations (12) and (13) can uniquely be
solved forMN andMP . From this solution one can infer the NHS size that
results from the NHS contract (by using KN = MNsN). Alternatively,
one can however think of the government as choosing NHS capacity KN
and work load sN . Then, the following system of equations
KN
sN
+MP = M
(
V (π(y, sN))
)
(14)
and
KN + sP (π(y, sN))MP = F (a). (15)
yields the salary of NHS doctors (y) and the amount of private physicians
(MP ) that ensure an equilibrium without rationing in the doctor market:
y = y(sN , KN) and MP = MP (sN , KN).
In line with what has just been said, the government is, in the follow-
ing, seen as choosing NHS capacity KN . Equivalently, it can be seen as
deciding on â since the demand for NHS consultations must equate the
NHS capacity (F (â) = KN).
4 The equilibrium waiting time for NHS
services
As we have set up the model, all citizens need medical care once a year
and total demand for health care is therefore entirely inelastic. What
is left to patients’ discretion is whether they resort to the NHS or the
private sector. As we have seen in the previous section, when an NHS
and a private sector coexist, the equilibrium fee for a private consultation
is determined by the no-arbitrage condition (11). This means that for a
given capacity of the NHS sector, KN = sN MN , it is up to the waiting
8
time w to allocate patients across the two sectors: w will adjust such
that the demand for NHS consultations matches the NHS capacity, i.e.
F (â) = KN (see also Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984 and Martin and
Smith, 1999). The equilibrium waiting time, that acts here as a rationing
device3, is thus deﬁned by a no-arbitrage condition for patients:
r(h− δw) + v((1− t)â,−T) = r(h) + v((1− t)â,−T − q) (16)
with â satisfying F (â) = KN .
Straightforward diﬀerentiation of (16) gives the following insights:
dr(h− δw)
dâ
= (1− t)[α̂P L̂P − α̂N L̂N ] > 0, (17)
dr(h− δw)
dt
= −â[α̂P L̂P − α̂N L̂N ] < 0, (18)
dr(h− δw)
dT
= −[α̂P − α̂N ] < 0, (19)
dr(h− δw)
dq
= −α̂P < 0, (20)
where a hat on a variable denotes its value for an individual with ability
â i.e. indiﬀerent between the two sectors, and subscripts N and P mean
evaluation of the variable at lump-sum income of m = −T for an NHS
patient and m = −T − q for a private patient, respectively. Recall that
α stands for the marginal utility of income. The signs of the derivatives
are motivated by the facts that marginal utility of income is falling in
consumption and that leisure is a normal good. Along with the separa-
bility assumption that health status does not aﬀect labour supply, these
facts imply that α̂P > α̂N and L̂P > L̂N . The marginal patient resorting
to the private market works more and has a lower consumption of the
composite good than the one resorting to the NHS. Therefore, we may
conclude that the equilibrium waiting time is
3In our model, the waiting time does not result from the stochastic arrival of
patients facing a NHS capacity constraint. See e.g. Worthington (1987) for a model
where it does.
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• reduced by a larger NHS capacity;
• increased by a higher marginal tax rate;
• increased by a higher lump sum tax; and
• increased by a higher out-of-pocket payment to private physicians.
This is for a mixed system. If we have a pure NHS system, the
waiting time has no longer a role as an allocative device and thus falls to
zero. The model is thus discontinuous in the waiting time: with a small
parallel private sector, the waiting time is strictly positive, but it falls to
zero when health care is exclusively provided by the NHS.
5 Welfare evaluation
The government disposes of the following policy instruments: KN (or
equivalently â), y, sN , σ, t and T , some of them being linked by the
equilibrium conditions (14) and (15). In the remainder of the paper, we
want to characterise the optimal selection of these instruments. We take
as the criterion for evaluation an additive social welfare function that is
deﬁned as follows:
SW =
∫ â
a
ψ
(
r(h− δw) + v((1− t)a,−T)) dF (a)
+
∫ a
â
ψ
(
r(h) + v
(
(1− t)a,−T − q)) dF (a), (21)
with ψ(·) being a concave transformation of individual utility functions:
ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ ≤ 0. We close the model by including a budget constraint
for the government. It states that labour income tax revenue should
cover the wage bill of the NHS, the subsidies to private health care, and
possibly some exogenous level of government expenditure R:∫ â
a
taL
(
(1−t)a,−T)dF (a)+∫ a
â
taL
(
(1−t)a,−T −(1−σ)π)dF (a)
+T ≥ yMN + σπ[1− F (â)] +R. (22)
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The problem of a social planner is then to maximise social welfare by
choosing appropriately the above policy instruments under the govern-
ment’s budget constraint, equilibrium conditions (14) and (15) in the
physician market, and condition (16) that determines the equilibrium
waiting time.
To analyse this problem in Section 6, we ﬁrst consider the case where
we impose the NHS contract to be production eﬃcient. As shown later,
production eﬃciency is optimal when the supply elasticity of physicians
εMU is inﬁnite. Next, we will relax this assumption in Section 7 and allow
for a ﬁnite supply elasticity and so for the possibility that the government
exerts some monopsony power in the physician market.
6 Optimal NHS size under a production-
eﬃcient NHS contract
As said in the introduction, production eﬃciency in providing health
care requires that the marginal reservation wage of physicians be equated
across the two sectors. In this section, the NHS contract is chosen so as
to satisfy production eﬃciency. In a system where both sectors coexist,
we have from (9) and (10) that U(y, 1− sN) = V (π). As illustrated by
y
V (πe)
πe
seN = sP (π
e) s
ye = πesP (π
e)
Figure 1: Work load and income for physicians under production
efficiency
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Figure 1, production eﬃciency then requires that seN = sP (π
e) and ye =
πe sP (π
e), where πe denotes the market clearing consultation fee that
satisﬁes:
M
(
V (πe)
)
sP (π
e) ≡ F (a) = 1. (23)
Therefore, with the NHS contract satisfying production eﬃciency, the
equilibrium fee, πe, does not depend upon the policy instruments con-
trolled by the government, and the terms of the NHS contract, y and sN ,
can be determined in a straightforward way, which simpliﬁes the analysis.
As pointed out in Section 3, in this production eﬃciency case the
market shares of the two sectors are determined through the choice
by the government of the capacity of the NHS or equivalently â (since
F (â) = KN). The marginal patient resorting to the NHS must be indif-
ferent between receiving care there and getting private treatment. And
for a given out-of-pocket payment q = (1 − σ)πe, it is the waiting time
that will ensure indiﬀerence. In what follows, we regard â, t, T,and σ as
the decision variables of the government.
The Lagrangian function of the maximisation problem then becomes:
L =
∫ â
a
ψ
[
r(h− δwe) + v((1− t)a,−T)]dF (a)
+
∫ a
â
ψ
[
r(h) + v
(
(1− t)a,−T − (1− σ)πe)]dF (a)
+ λ
{∫ â
a
taL
(
(1− t)a,−T)dF (a)
+
∫ a
â
taL
(
(1− t)a,−T − (1− σ)πe)dF (a)
+ T − F (â) y
e
sP (π
e)
− σπe[1− F (aˆ)]−R
}
(24)
where we is obtained from
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r(h− δwe) + v((1− t)â,−T) = r(h) + v((1− t)â,−T − (1− σ)πe).
Using (17), the derivative of this Lagrangian w.r.t. â is given by
dL
daˆ
= (1− t) (α̂P L̂P − α̂N L̂N)E[ψ′(·)|a ≤ â]F (â)
−λ{tâ(L̂P − L̂N) + (1− σ)πe}f(â). (25)
The ﬁrst term is the eﬀect on the welfare of the NHS patients of an
increase in â through a reduction in the waiting time. There are F (â)
patients enjoying this rise of welfare. The second term stands for the bud-
getary implications of the increase in aˆ. These consists of (i) a reduction
in income tax revenue because the labour supply of the patients switch-
ing sector is negatively aﬀected, and (ii) a net increase in the health care
budget (each new NHS patient receives a treatment that costs πe, but
saves the government refunding σπe). There are f(â) marginal patients
switching sector.
Evaluating expression (25) for a = a leaves us with no beneﬁts and
only budgetary costs. Introducing a small NHS sector is therefore welfare
deteriorating. We summarise this as
Proposition 1 In the production eﬃciency case, the introduction of a
small NHS sector is harmful for social welfare.
As expression (25) indicates, this result is explained by the number
of NHS patients, F (â), who beneﬁt from the fall in waiting time when
the size of the NHS is increased, relative to the number of patients, f(â),
who shift from the private sector to the NHS and so negatively aﬀect
the government’s budget balance. When the NHS is of small size, there
are only a few individuals beneﬁting from the fall in waiting time, and
so the social cost of an increase in this size outweighs its social beneﬁt.
The same reasoning also explains why when the size of the NHS is large
enough, the social beneﬁt of an increases in the NHS size can dominate
its social cost. There are then enough patients who beneﬁt from the re-
duction in waiting time.
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If it is optimal to have a strictly positive NHS, the welfare eﬀects
of a reduction in waiting time should at the margin balance with the
budgetary implications. Setting therefore (25) to zero and rearranging
gives us
1
λ
â(1− t)(α̂P L̂P − α̂N L̂N)E[ψ′(·)|a ≤ â]
tâ(L̂P − L̂N) + (1− σ)πe
=
f̂ â
F̂
. (26)
The lhs is the ratio of the beneﬁt per NHS patient of the rise in aˆ (mea-
sured in government revenue) to its budgetary cost per patient switching
sector, while the rhs is the elasticity of the distribution function at â.
For many familiar distribution functions, this elasticity falls in â.
Our purpose is now to construct examples that show that it can be
optimal to have an NHS sector if its size is suﬃciently large. In these
examples, we adopt the following speciﬁcation of the utility function:
log c− L/γ. If (1− t)a ≥ m/γ, an agent of ability a will want to partic-
ipate in the labour market, and the optimal levels of his consumption,
labour supply and non-health indirect utility are respectively given by
c = γ(1−t)a, L = γ−m/(1−t)a, and v = log((1−t)aγ)−1+m/γ(1−t)a.
Recall that m is equal to either −T for NHS patients or −T − q for pri-
vate ones.
Let us assume for the moment that the tax policy does not drive any
NHS patient out of the labour force. Replacing the optimal labour sup-
plies in (22) by γ+T/(1−t)a for NHS patients and γ+(T+q)/(1− t)a for
private patients, the government budget constraint can then be rewritten
as
T = (1− t)[R + πeF (â)− t E(a)γ]− (t− σ)πe[1− F (â)] (27)
where E(a)≡
∫ a
a
a dF (a). Assuming a utilitarian social welfare function
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(ψ′ ≡ 1), condition (26) can then be ﬁlled in to give:4
aH
â
=
f̂ â
F̂
(28)
where aH is deﬁned as the harmonic mean of the ability distribution,
that is
aH ≡
(∫ a
a
1
a
dF (a)
)−1
.
Therefore with this speciﬁcation of the utility function the tax and sub-
sidy parameters no longer enter the lhs of ﬁrst-order condition (26): the
optimal size of the NHS depends only on the shape of the ability distri-
bution. Let us now take a closer look at two examples of distribution
functions:
Example 1 Uniform ability distribution.
If F (a) =
a− a
a− a on [a, a], then aH =
a− a
log a− log a and (28) becomes
1
â
a− a
log a− log a =
â
â− a.
This expression may be written as a second degree equation in â/a:(
â
a
)2
+
(
1− â
a
) a
a
− 1
log a
a
= 0
which has real roots if and only if log a
a
≤ a
a
− 1, or a ≥ 10.35a. In that
case there are two positive real roots, and since social welfare is initially
decreasing in â, it is the second root that is a local maximum.
4The relevant individual variables are as follows: L̂P = γ+(T+(1−σ)πe)/(1−t) â,
L̂N = γ + T/(1 − t) â and α̂P = α̂N = 1/γ(1 − t) â. Since dT/dR = 1 − t (cf (27)),
the social marginal utility of income, λ, is:
∫ a
a
(1/γa)dF (a), or just 1/γaH .
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Figure 2 gives an example where this local maximum is also the
global one.5 It makes use of the following parameters: a = 10, a =
160, γ = .25, πe = 5 and R = 10. With σ set equal to 0, the optimal
value for â is 40.78, meaning that the NHS serves almost 25% of the
population. The optimal tax policy is t = .375 and T = .428. Under this
policy nobody withdraws from the labour market.
SW
140
â
20 40 60 80 100 120
5.5
5.48
5.46
5.44
5.36
5.34
5.32
5.4
5.38
5.42
160
Figure 2: Social welfare as a function of â (the uniform case)
Example 2 Log-uniform ability distribution.
With F (a) =
log a− log a
log a− log a , the ability distribution is skewed to the right
on [a, a] and aH now equals
(
log a− log a
a− a
)
aa. The aˆ-rule may now be
5As mentioned at the end of Section 4, the waiting time discontinuously falls to
zero when the mixed system becomes a pure private one (aˆ = a = 160). Furthermore
as the ﬁgure shows, social welfare with a pure NHS system is at the same level as
with a pure private system (aˆ = 0). The latter result holds only if sN = sP (πe) as it
is assumed in the present section.
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written as
a
a
log a
a
a
a
− 1 =
aˆ
a
log aˆ
a
which has more than one real root for aˆ/a if a ≥ 12.2a. Again, the spread
between the lowest and largest ability level must be suﬃciently high for
a mixed health care system to be optimal.
Figure 3 provides an example with an interior global maximum for
a log-uniform ability distribution. The parameters used in this example
are: a = 10, a = 300, γ = .25, πe = 5, and R = 20. Average ability is
then 85.26. Setting again σ = 0, the optimal value for â is 67.22 with
F (aˆ) = .56 and the optimal tax policy is t = .603 and T = 2.615. Once
again, under this policy nobody withdraws from the labour market.
SW
20050 100 150
â
3.96
3.94
3.92
3.9
3.82
3.8
3.78
3.86
3.84
3.88
250 300
Figure 3: Social welfare as a function of aˆ (the log-uniform case)
These two examples point to a more general result, namely that social
welfare is not a nicely concave function in the size of the NHS. The fact
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that the introduction of a small NHS reduces welfare does not preclude
that a larger public health care system may improve upon a purely pri-
vate solution. But the necessary condition for this to occur is that there
is a suﬃciently unequal distribution of earnings capacities.
We summarize our ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A mixed health care system can be socially optimal. The
likelihood for this to happen rises with increased dispersion of the ability
distribution.
Our result about the desirability of an NHS is akin to the one ob-
tained by Besley and Coate (1991). Like in their model, individuals
consume here one unit of a private good, which they can either acquire
free of charge by resorting to the public sector or buy at some price in
the private sector. If the quality level in the public sector is lower than
in the private market (due to the waiting time in our model), some indi-
viduals will prefer to pay for a higher-quality good in the private sector.
If quality is a normal good, these individuals will also have the highest
incomes. Besley and Coate show that in such framework public provision
of the private good can redistribute income from rich to poor when it is
ﬁnanced by a head tax levied on the whole population. The same argu-
ment can be used here to explain why a mixed health care system can be
optimal when the NHS is ﬁnanced by a linear income tax that is imposed
to all citizens irrespective of the sector they resort to for receiving care.6
To characterise the optimal linear tax policy, we proceed in the stan-
dard way, substracting the ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t. T multiplied by
E(aL) from the ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t. t. After rearranging the result
of this operation, we obtain:
6Hoel and Sæther (2000) derive a similar result. Their setting is a partial equilib-
rium model of the health care sector with an exogenous marginal cost of public funds
and with patients diﬀering in their waiting time cost. They construct an example
with a two class population, and ﬁnd that if there is a suﬃciently wide gap between
the waiting costs for the two classes, it is optimal to have a positive waiting time that
makes the high waitng cost class resort to the private market.
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t =
−cov(β, aL)
E(a
∂Lc
∂ω
a)
+ [E(aL)(α̂P − α̂N)
−â(α̂P L̂P − α̂N L̂N)]F (â)E[ψ
′(·)|a ≤ â]
λE(a
∂Lc
∂ω
a)
(29)
where ∂Lc/∂ω is the compensated wage eﬀect on labour supply, and
β ≡ ψ′(·)α/λ + ta∂L/∂m is Diamond’s net social marginal utility of a
one Euro income transfer to agent a.
Expression (29) is a modiﬁed rule a` la Sheshinski (1972) for the op-
timal marginal income tax rate. The ﬁrst rhs term is the standard term
trading oﬀ equity considerations (numerator) with eﬃciency considera-
tions (denominator). The second rhs term is new and has to do with
the eﬀect on the waiting time of a change in the marginal tax rate; from
(18) and (19) the square bracket is in fact (dr/dt)−E(aL)(dr/dT ). It is
diﬃcult to say a priori how an increase in the marginal tax rate, accom-
panied by a decrease in the lump sum rate to balance the budget, will
aﬀect the waiting time. What we can say is that7
dr
dt
− E(aL) dr
dT
< 0 if âL̂N < E(al) < âL̂P ,
7 0 âL̂N < âL̂P < E(al),
< 0 E(al) < âL̂N < âL̂P .
Therefore if the income level earned by the marginal patient resorting to
the private sector lies above the average income level, then a small tax
reform boosts the waiting time. This is in itself a reason for setting the
marginal tax rate below the standard level.
In the standard model of income redistribution, the lump-sum tax
T is chosen to set the average value of Diamond’s β equal to 1. In the
present model, this rule is modiﬁed because the lump-sum tax has an
impact on the equilibrium waiting time:
Eβ = 1− 1
λ
(âP − âN) E[ψ′(·)|a ≤ â]F (â). (30)
7We make use of the facts that α̂P − α̂N > 0 and that L̂P − L̂N > 0.
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The beneﬁt for the government’s budget of a marginal increase in T is
reduced by the undesirable consequence of a longer waiting time for all
NHS patients.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to σ is
E(β|a ≥ â) = 1− α̂P
λ
E[ψ′(·)|a ≤ â] F (â)
1− F (â) (31)
where the lhs is the average β for individuals with a > â. The refund
rate σ acts as a lump-sum instrument for all patients visiting a private
doctor. However, when private visits are made more attractive through
a larger refund, the equilibrating waiting time will fall and this beneﬁts
the part of the population that visits an NHS physician. This explains
why the direct cost of a one Euro refund on the rhs of (31) is corrected
downwards. This is a formalisation of an argument used in public debates
in favour of a parallel private health care system: it relieves pressure on
the public system and allows lower income classes being treated there
to get faster treatment. Inspection of the second rhs term in (31) shows
that this argument is stronger, the bigger the NHS (for the obvious reason
that more people beneﬁt from the shorter waiting time, and because the
impact on the equilibrium waiting time is then stronger) and the higher
the social evaluation of the living standard of lower income classes.8
Condition (31) can be combined with (30) to yield:
E(β|a ≤ â) = 1 + α̂N
λ
E[ψ′(·)|a ≤ â]. (32)
This expression would be the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to a co-
payment for NHS consultations if the government were to charge one.
This copayment would act as a lum-sum tax on NHS patients, the marginal
net social cost of which appears on the lhs of the expression. There would
be also beneﬁts associated with the copayment: they consist of additional
government revenue and reduction in waiting time for NHS patients, that
are accounted for the by the ﬁrst and second terms respectively on the
8In our examples, both the marginal utility of income, the marginal cost of public
funds, and the income eﬀects on labour supply are constant so that condition (31)
can only hold by accident in which case σ is indeterminate.
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rhs. It is however worthwhile recognizing that with both σ and T avail-
able as policy instruments, a copayment for NHS services becomes a
redundant instrument.
7 The optimal NHS contract
In the previous section, we assumed that the government oﬀers NHS
physicians a contract with a work load identical to the one chosen by
private physicians. This achieved production eﬃciency in the provision
of consultations, i.e. NHS and private doctors have the same marginal
reservation fee for a consultation, and as Figure 1 illustrates, this com-
mon reservation fee is equal to y/sN . We now look at the desirability of
oﬀering a diﬀerent contract. Of course, the utility that physicians derive
from an NHS contract must equal that of a private practice. But by
manipulating the terms of the contract and departing from production
eﬃciency, the government can inﬂuence this common equilibrium utility
level and in this way reduce the cost of running the NHS. The reason is
that the government has monopsony power on the market for physicians.
We proceed in two steps. First, we investigate the optimal choice
of the NHS contract when the government is only concerned with min-
imizing public expenditure on health care. This allows us to better un-
derstand the optimal contract choice when the government instead max-
imises social welfare, an issue we turn to in the second step.
Let us therefore assume in a ﬁrst stage that the government only
cares about public expenditure on health care, subject to the constraint
that F (â) patients are treated in the NHS. Expenditure on health care
consists of the NHS wage bill, MN y, and subsidies to private health care,
σπ(y, sN)[1−F (â)]. We start from eqs (14) and (15) that give y(sN , KN)
as explained at the end of Section 3, and ﬁnd in the appendix that
∂y
∂sN
= MRF − MN
M
y
sN
1
εMy +
MP
M
εsPπ ε
π
y
(33)
where MRF ≡ U/Uy = −Us/Uy is an NHS physician’s marginal reserva-
tion fee for a consultation and επy and ε
M
y are elasticities that are deﬁned
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by επy = (∂π(y, sn)/∂y)(y/π) = (U
N
y /sPU
P
y )(y/π) and ε
M
y = ε
M
U ε
U
y .
Since KN = F (â), the expenditure minimisation problem is
min
sN
Ω[sN , σ,KN ] ≡ y(sN , KN)KN
sN
+ σπ(y(sN , KN), sN) [1−KN ].
In the appendix, we show that the ﬁrst order condition that sN must
satisfy to minimize expenditure can be written as:
MRF − ysN
y
sN
=
MN
M
1
εMy +
MP
M
εsPπ ε
π
y
1 + επy σπy
sN
1−KN
KN
 . (34)
We therefore depart from the standard rule that the work load of NHS
physicians be chosen so as to equate their marginal reservation fee for
a consultation with the cost of an additional consultation (i.e. y/sN)
(which is in our setting equivalent to satisfy production eﬃciency). Con-
dition (34) provides the optimal markup between these two quantities.
It is noteworthy that if the elasticity of doctor supply εMU , and therefore
εMy , were inﬁnite, this markup would be nil. In this case, production
eﬃciency would be optimal.
Condition (34) is an inverse elasticity rule where three elasticities are
important: the elasticity of total doctor supply w.r.t. the NHS salary,
εMy , the elasticity of private consultations supplied w.r.t. the consultation
fee, εsPπ , and the elasticity of the equilibrium consultation fee w.r.t. the
NHS salary, επy . Assuming for a moment that ε
sP
π ≡ 0 (e.g. Cobb-Douglas
physician preferences) and σ = 0 (no refunding of private care), it is easy
to see why the government wants to give NHS physicians a higher work
load than the one their private colleagues choose (sN > sP ). If the gov-
ernment’s objective is to care for F (â) patients through the NHS, the
higher work load per NHS physician means that fewer such physicians
need to be hired. If εMU is ﬁnite, this allows the NHS to reduce its overall
wage bill since the reservation utility of the marginal physician (U˜) falls.
So the monopsony power of the government on the market for doctors
gives an incentive for the government to depart from the standard rule,
and this will be more pronounced the higher the share of NHS doctors
22
and the smaller the elasticity of the supply of doctors. The smaller this
elasticity, the more ‘stingy’ the government can be in remunerating its
personnel for a higher work load.
Let us now assume that εsPπ = 0, still keeping σ = 0. The elasticity
εsPπ can be either positive or negative according to whether the substi-
tution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect or not. If positive, the second
term in the denominator of the second factor on the rhs of (34) pushes
the markup and so the work load sN downwards. This can be explained
as follows. As mentioned earlier, a rise in sN makes U˜ fall; this in turn
lowers π and therefore sP since ε
sP
π > 0. However, a lower work load in
the private sector means that more private physicians are needed to take
care of the F (a)− F (â) patients there, and this acts on M and so U˜ in
opposite direction to the rise in sN . By contrast, if ε
sP
π < 0, the eﬀect on
the required number of physicians of an increase in sN is reinforced by
that of an increase in sP .
Also the presence of a health care subsidy at rate σ pushes the work
load upwards. The reason here is that a tougher work load in the NHS
has a negative impact on the equilibrium fee for private consultations
and, to the extent these are subsidised, on government spending.
We may thus conclude that, in the short run, when the supply of doc-
tors is rather inelastic, the government should demand a heavier work
load from NHS physicians than the one private doctors perform. This is
in stark contrast with what we observe in countries with an NHS: there
public doctors work less than their private colleagues, but often the for-
mer also have a private practice on the side. This will not happen when
salaries are set according to (34) because at the margin, an NHS doctor
reservation fee exceeds market fee π.
How does minimal public expenditure vary when the NHS capacity
KN = F (â) increases? Plugging the optimal NHS work load back into
the expenditure function gives the minimal expenditure as a function of
the size of the NHS:
Θ(σ,KN) ≡ min
sN
Ω[sN , σ,KN ].
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It is shown in the appendix that
∂Θ
∂KN
= (1− sN
sP
)(MRF − y
sN
) +
y
sN
− σπ. (35)
First, notice that for sN = sP , this expression reduces to (1−σ)πe so
that public expenditure is proportional toKN . But as we just observed, it
will only be optimal under special circumstances to have the same number
of consultations per physician in the two sectors. The government can
in general reduce expenditure by choosing sN above sP . And this means
that public expenditure will rise less than proportionally to KN , and that
for small values of KN the relationship will be concave. In fact, since the
ﬁrst round bracket term in (35) is negative, public expenditure on health
care may even fall as the NHS treats more patients. This will occur when
the markup in (34) is very large, which in turn is optimal when e.g. the
elasticity of the supply of physicians is very small. Figure 4 illustrates
minimal expenditure as a function of the number of patients treated in
the NHS in an example for which εMU is equal to 2.
9
In this ﬁgure the curve and the straight line exhibit how public health
expenditure varies when the government does and does not exploit re-
spectively its monopsony power in the physician market. According to
Figure 4, the minimal public expenditure on health care, Θ(σ,KN), will
not be a convex function of the number of NHS patients. This means
that we have identiﬁed a second reason in addition to the one exhibited
in Section 6 for which social welfare is not necessarily a concave function
of the NHS size.
Our assumption in the ﬁrst step that the government selects the terms
of the NHS contract to minimise public expenditure on health care, for
a given size of the NHS, is however ad hoc because this contract will de-
termine the equilibrium consultation fee of private physicians and thus
9The ﬁgure is drawn under the following assumptions: U = c
1
4 
3
4 , a physician’s
time endowment is 200, M(U) = 900
(
U
1500
)γ
, and there are 45000 citizens. There-
fore we depart from our above normalization rules concerning a physician’s time
endowment and population size. Then, under a pure private market equilibrium (or,
alternatively, when sN = sP ), πe = 30000, sP (πe) = 50, V (πe) = 1500 and M = 900.
Figure 4 is for γ = εMU = 2. Since ε
U
y = 1/4, this gives ε
M
y = 1/2. The units on the
vertical axis are in 100 Euros and on the horizontal axis in 1000 citizens.
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Figure 4: Minimal public expenditure on health care with and
without the use of monopsony power for εMy = 1/2 (the curve
and the straight line respectively)
aﬀect the welfare of private patients and of NHS patients through the
waiting time. We therefore turn in the second step to the choice of sN
when social welfare is to be maximised. If anything, the concern for pa-
tient welfare reinforces the argument for pushing sN upwards, because
that will reduce the equilibrium consultation fee and the waiting time.
There is however a third eﬀect which we have ignored so far: the reduc-
tion in the consultation fee will have a negative income eﬀect on private
patients’ labour supply and thus on income tax revenue.
The three side eﬀects just mentioned – on waiting time for NHS pa-
tients, on disposable income of private patients, and on tax revenue –
are also present when the government increases the subsidy rate σ. Op-
timizing the Lagrangian (24) with respect to sN and σ, we show in the
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appendix that the following inverse elasticity rule holds:
MRF − y
sN
y
sN
=
MN
M
1
(εMy +
MP
M
εsPπ ε
π
y )
(
1 + επy
π
y
sN
1−KN
KN
)
. (36)
It is according to this rule that the government should set the terms
of the NHS contract if it is concerned with social welfare maximisation.
Three things are worth noting about this equation. First, except for the
non-appearance of σ on the rhs, it is exactly the same as the inverse
elasticity rule for expenditure minimisation. Second, this markup rule is
obtained without using any argument about the optimal choice of â, and
it therefore holds for any positive size of the NHS system. Finally, it is
derived without using the optimality conditions for the tax policy.
y
V (πe)
y∗
π∗ sN
ye = πesP (π
e)
V (π∗)
πe
sP(π
∗)sP(πe)
s∗N
Figure 5: Work load and income for physicians when the gov-
ernment chooses NHS contract (y∗, s∗N) according to (36)
The optimal contract is illustrated in Figure 5 as (y∗, s∗N), and we sum-
marise our discussion of this contract in
Proposition 3 The optimal NHS contract should specify a work load
and a salary for physicians that satisﬁes the inverse elasticity rule (36).
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According to this rule, the marginal reservation fee for an NHS physician
should exceed the average fee, which in turn should exceed the equilibrium
fee for private consultations. Equivalently, an NHS physician should per-
form more consultations than a private physician. This optimal contract
takes away any incentive for NHS physicians to top up their income by
private consultations.
Finally, we mention that we have treated physicians as absentees by
not including their welfare into the social welfare function. It is clear
that if we had done so, the reasons for an upward distortion in the work
load of NHS doctors would have been mitigated.
8 Concluding remarks
The organisation of the health care sector is a theme for public debate in
many countries. One of the main issues in this discussion is who should
be responsible for the provision of health care. Should it be provided pri-
vately, should the production be in public hands, or should patients have
both options available? We have been looking at this issue in a setting
where people diﬀer in their earnings capacity and display an inelastic de-
mand for health care. We assumed that illness reduces a person’s living
standard when treatment is postponed, but does not aﬀect the person’s
earnings capacity. Treatment can be obtained either in a competitive
private sector or in the NHS where it is provided free of charge but after
some (endogenous) waiting time. The health care sector is in equilib-
rium when the fee for private consultations is such that no physician has
an incentive to switch place of work, and in addition waiting time in
the NHS is such that no patients wants to switch health care provider.
This equilibrium, and in particular the size of each sector, is governed by
three public policies: the income tax system that should ensure a bal-
anced budget, the subsidisation of private health care, and the terms of
the contract oﬀered to NHS physicians. Assuming that the government
has welfaristic objectives, we analysed the optimal policies. Our analysis
highlighted three ﬁndings. First, a small public health care sector gives
a lower social welfare level than a pure private system. Second, a mixed
system with a suﬃciently large NHS may improve upon a pure private
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system. A necessary condition for this to happen is that the distribu-
tion of earnings capacities in society is suﬃciently wide. And ﬁnally, the
doctors working there should be given a contract that speciﬁes a heavier
work load than the one their private colleagues choose.This is the way the
government can exert its monopsony power on the market for physicians
to improve social welfare.
Our assumptions also delineate the limitations of our model. The
actual market for private health care is not likely to be perfectly compet-
itive. Physicians may exert monopoly power in setting the consultation
fee because it is costly for their patients to switch to a new physician who
is not informed about the patient’s health history. Satterthwaite (1985)
has argued that a monopolistic structure for the health care market is
more reasonable for many countries.
A second issue is the cost of having to wait for a treatment. We have
assumed that waiting incurs a direct cost because it inﬂicts discomfort
on the patient. But on top of that, a reduced health status will have
consequences for one’s earnings capacity. Even though a social insurance
policy can protect the individual patient from the loss in income, it can-
not protect the productive possibilities in the economy as a whole.
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Appendix
A. Derivation of (33)
Eliminating MP between (14) and (15) gives
KN +
[
M(U(y, 1− sN))− KN
sN
]
sP (π(y, sN)) = F (a). (A.1)
Diﬀerentiating this expression and accounting for the fact that from (11),
∂π/∂sN = (−U/Uy)∂π/∂y yields:
dy
[
M ′UysP +Mp
∂sP
∂π
π
y
]
+dsN
[
−M ′UsP −MP ∂sP
∂π
U
Uy
∂π
∂y
+
KNsP
s2N
sP
]
= 0, (A.2)
from which (33) can be obtained after some easy manipulations.
B. Derivation of (34)
The ﬁrst-order condition that sN must satisfy for a minimum of public
expenditure Ω is obtained by equating to zero:
∂Ω
∂sN
=
(
∂y
∂sN
− y
sN
)
KN
sN
+ σ(1−KN)
(
∂π
∂y
∂y
∂sN
− ∂π
∂sN
)
. (A.3)
Using relations ∂π/∂y = Uy/Vπ and ∂π/∂sN = −U/Vπ, recalling that
MRF = U/Uy and substituting ∂y/∂sN from (33) into this ﬁrst-order
condition yields relation (34) in a straightforward way.
C. Derivation of (35) and (36)
Diﬀerentiating (A.1) yields:
dy
[
M ′UysP +MP
∂sP
∂π
∂π
∂y
]
+ dKN
[
1− sP
sN
]
= 0, (A.4)
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which we rearrange to obtain
∂y
∂KN
=
sP (π)− sN
M sP (π)sN
1
(εMy +
MP
M
εsPπ ε
π
y )
. (A.5)
Using the envelope theorem leads to:
∂Θ
∂KN
=
y
sN
− σπ +
[
MN + σ
∂π
∂y
(1−KN)
]
∂y
∂KN
. (A.6)
Sustituting ∂y/∂KN from (35) into this derivative and using (34) then
gives expression (36) after some manipulations.
D. Derivation of (37)
The Lagrangian in (24) can be written as:
L = Σ + λΩ (A.7)
where Σ is the sum of the government’s objective and the part of its
budget constraint that is related to tax revenue (multiplied by λ). Re-
call that Ω stands for public expenditure. Thus the derivatives of the
Lagrangian with respect to sN and σ are :
dL
dsN
=
∂Σ
∂q
(1− σ)
[
∂π
∂y
dy
dsN
+
∂π
∂sN
]
+ λ
∂Ω
∂sN
= 0, (A.8)
dL
dσ
= −∂Σ
∂q
π + λ
∂Ω
∂σ
= 0. (A.9)
Combining (A.8) and (A.9) yields
(1− σ)∂Ω
∂σ
[
∂π
∂y
dy
dsN
+
∂π
∂sN
]
+ π
∂Ω
∂sN
= 0. (A.10)
Using (A.3) and the fact that ∂Ω/∂σ = π(1 −KN), this expression can
be rewritten as:
(1− σ)(1 +KN)
[
∂π
∂y
dy
dsN
+
∂π
∂sN
]
+
(
∂y
∂sN
− y
sN
)
+σ(1−KN)
[
∂π
∂y
∂y
∂sN
− ∂π
∂sN
]
= 0 (A.11)
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which simpliﬁes to(
∂y
∂sN
− y
sN
)
+ (1−KN)
[
∂π
∂y
∂y
∂sN
− ∂π
∂sN
]
= 0. (A.12)
This is identical to the rhs of (A.3) except for the absence of σ in front
of the second term. Proceeding in the same way as (34) was obtained
from (A.3) yields (37).
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